INTRODUCTION
This article explores the disjuncture between domestic legal and political responses to forced marriage faced by nationals of Western states with the response of refugee law to forced marriages occurring elsewhere. The framework of international human rights suggests that forced marriage should be a paradigm example of 'persecution', the central criterion for any refugee claim. Yet our analysis of refugee decisions in Australia, Canada, and the United Kingdom revealed a profound and on-going reluctance to accept that forced marriage was, in and of itself, a persecutory harm.
The issue of forced marriage emerged in Europe in the mid 1990s as a locus of considerable public and political concern. Attention focused on young women from first or second generation immigrant backgrounds forced or pressured to marry men from their parent's country of origin. Although paternalistically framed, and arguably informed by racist tropes of cultural 'tradition', family 'honour' and immigration 'convenience' or fraud, some of these domestic initiatives were also motivated by feminist and migrant women's groups and involved active and on-going commitment to ensuring young women's sexual and social agency. These domestic initiatives are starkly at odds with how forced marriage appears in refugee law, where a threatened or actual forced marriage is rarely held to trigger protection obligations. law provisions in recent years in response to a surge in public and political mobilisation. We then turn to the centrepiece of our analysis, the case set of 120 refugee decisions involving a claim of forced marriage as persecution. This case set includes all available decisions in English over the past fifteen years from the United Kingdom, Canada and Australia.
(Because of marked differences in US asylum law, policy and procedure, our analysis of the available US cases is published separately. 1 ) Our analysis considers how these cases address the key areas of refugee jurisprudence in forced marriage claims: persecution, nexus, credibility and membership in a particular social group. The final section of the paper is an examination of the work of Britain's Forced Marriage Unit. The Forced Marriage Unit is a unique government entity, providing a range of assistance, including extraterritorial assistance, in response to individual requests for state protection in avoiding and escaping forced marriage. Yet, strikingly, British refugee jurisprudence has evinced a deep and ongoing resistance to forced marriage claims in comparison with Canada and Australia, where forced marriage has not yet emerged as a major domestic policy issue.
We conclude that forced marriage provides a key site for understanding and explaining the persistent failure of refugee law to fully embrace human rights norms, especially as they relate to gender and sexuality. This failure is caused by the structure of refugee law, which is erected on a foundation of 'othering' and is sustained by a recurrent division between 'us' and 'them'. This dichotomy means that refugee law endlessly replicates a division between the prosperous, benevolent, liberal and rights respecting West, and the impoverished and encultured others who threaten to overwhelm 'us' if the floodgates are not kept tightly closed. While we acknowledge that there are many valid criticisms to be made of international human rights discourse generally and domestic initiatives on forced marriage specifically, our analysis in this article reflects our belief that meaningful consent to marriage is nevertheless an issue of vital importance. We proceed from the premise that the state has a role, indeed a duty, in protecting consent to marriage that extends to responding to claims for assistance from citizens and, in some circumstances, non-citizens.
FORCED MARRIAGE CLAIMS IN INTERNATIONAL LAW
The choice of whether, and whom, to marry is so intimately connected to self determination that it has been acknowledged in several key international instruments as a fundamental human right. The requirement that marriage be undertaken only with the 'free and full consent' of both parties was first enshrined in Article 16 (2) Given how marriage has been understood in human rights law, one would expect that the issue of forced marriage would find a direct fit in the framework of refugee law. Our study of forced marriage instead demonstrates a stark disjuncture between refugee jurisprudence and human rights jurisprudence. At international law, a refugee is someone who:
owing to a well-founded fear of being persecuted for reasons of race, religion, nationality, membership of a particular social group or political opinion, is outside the country of his nationality and is unable, or owing to such a fear, is unwilling to avail himself of the protection of that country; or who, not having a nationality and being outside the country of his former habitual residence as a result of such events, is unable or, owing to such fear, is unwilling to return to it. On the basis of this definition, international refugee law provides 'surrogate' protection for individuals whose country of nationality cannot or will not protect them from certain types of harm. It is clear in the jurisprudence that states will not be held to the standard of protecting their citizens from every breach of an international human rights standard: some breaches constitute being persecuted and others do not. While the protection offered by refugee law is not identical to that offered by international human right law, it should be related to, and intelligible through, international human rights standards. 4 In his influential 1991 book James Hathaway argued that, 'persecution is most appropriately defined as the sustained or systematic failure of state protection in relation to one of the core entitlements which has been recognised by the international community'. 5 In defining core entitlements Hathaway proposed a four tiered human rights approach to persecution, organising human rights statements according to the degree of obligation they place on states. First and second tier rights are those enunciated in the UDHR and made binding by their inclusion in the ICCPR and the ICESCR. The first tier comprises non-derogable rights such as freedom from arbitrary deprivation of life, protection from torture and cruel inhuman and degrading treatment, freedom from slavery, the right to recognition as a person in law and freedom of thought, conscience and religion. The second tier comprises rights which are derogable only in cases of national emergency, such as freedom from arbitrary arrest or detention and the rights to marriage, privacy and family life with which we are concerned here. Any breach of the first tier and discriminatory or non-emergency breaches of the second tier would ordinarily be defined as persecutory. and coercion to marry from family and community members arises from cultural 'otherness.' 21 The twinning of these themes, combined with an implicit understanding of vulnerable brides as 'ours' and imposed grooms as 'theirs', generated an intense early focus on immigration restrictions as the 'answer' to the 'problem' of forced marriage.
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Of all European countries, Denmark directed its reform energies most explicitly and continuously towards immigration restriction. Legal changes limiting family reunification immigration provisions began in Denmark in 1998 and were tightened again in 2000, 2002 and 2004. 23 These restrictions included raising the age limit for those being sponsored or sponsoring as a spouse to 24, a reverse onus of proof requiring couples to show their marriage is voluntarily contracted, requirements for independent housing and financial capacity, a bar on spousal reunification for cousins who are married and a requirement that both spouses have a stronger 'affiliation' with Denmark than with any other country. 24 The impact of such provisions extends far beyond forced marriages, but they were justified on 19 Rukshana had been forced to marry a much older man chosen by her family but after several unhappy years and two children, she became involved with her childhood sweetheart and sought a divorce. She was seven months pregnant with her lover's child when she was killed. ex parte and without notice. 37 The order must be accompanied by an arrest power unless the court is convinced that in the circumstances this is not necessary to achieve the protection required. 38 In short, the legislation creates a flexible tool, broadly modelled on earlier legislative approaches to domestic violence protection orders. The Act strenuously reinforces a pro-active role for the courts in confronting and potentially averting forced marriage. 39 A key aspect of the United Kingdom's approach has been the establishment of the Forced Marriage Unit (FMU), within the Foreign and Commonwealth Office. We discuss this initiative later in the paper. At this point is it sufficient to note that the FMU has broad roles in education, support, and 'awareness raising', as well as in 'rescuing' victims of forced marriage.
Southall Black Sisters were ultimately very influential on the model adopted by government and have been recognised for their role in developing the legislation. 40 Their concerns regarding mediation and conciliation were taken squarely on board to the extent that the Statutory Guidance explicitly cautions that these practices, which are favoured in other child protection and family conflict contexts, are inappropriate in cases of forced marriage. 41 The guidance document requires all senior managers to ensure that staff are counselled to EWHC 3202 concerned an adult who was in Bangladesh in circumstances where friends feared that she was being held against her will and likely to be forced to marry. The Foreign Office brought proceedings in England on behalf of the woman. The Court extended the inherent jurisdiction developed in relation to incapacitated adults and medical decision-making to find that it held the jurisdiction to make orders and directions to locate the woman and to ascertain whether she was being held forcibly as well as to ascertain her 'true wishes'. from 18 to 21. 48 Additional measures, soon to be implemented, include a requirement that any person sponsoring a spouse must first register a declaration of intention to marry before departing the UK. This declaration will then be examined by a caseworker, assessed against a 'risk profile' for forced marriage with the prospect that the immigration officer may interview the sponsor for further information, refer them to support services, or even refuse the visa based on 'vulnerability grounds'.
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A feminist assessment of the British initiatives is complex. While it is evident that government initiatives in this arena inescapably reflect a post-colonial framework, we argue that the State does have a duty to act in response to claims for assistance from those facing forced marriage. It is clear that many women, and some men, in the UK call upon the police and other government agencies for support in resisting coerced marriage. In this context, even flawed or problematic responses are, we believe, to be preferred over government indifference. Moreover, many UK government responses reflect a feminist and communityinformed understanding that forced marriage is a harm that is based upon power imbalances concerning gender and sexuality rather than simply being a reflection of 'culture'. The Forced Marriage Unit information brochure for lesbians and gay men states:
A forced marriage is conducted without the consent of one or both people, and pressure or abuse is used. This could include both physical pressure (when someone threatens to or actually does hurt you) or emotional pressure (for example, when someone tries to make you feel that your sexuality brings shame on your family) to get married.
50
Given the pace and diversity of engagement in forced marriage issues in the United Kingdom, we anticipated that decision makers would have an increasingly well informed understanding of forced marriage as a gendered human rights abuse. Indeed in the 2002 wardship case Re M the court spoke of the often 'irrevocable step' for those escaping forced marriage in terms of familial abuse and social exclusion, and urged government entities to assist by 'offering effective exit':
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Courts and local and education authorities primarily, but also public authorities generally should recognise that their needs must be urgently and effectively met.
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Yet we found the refugee cases, in particular those decided by English courts and tribunals, were utterly at odds with these domestic developments. This is not to suggest that refugee case law should or could respond in precisely the same way as the domestic legal framework does. Rather, given refugee law's role as surrogate or 'back up' human rights protection, we would hope to find refugee law taking forced marriage seriously, viewing it as a gendered practice, and analysing it in ways that are commensurate with human rights infused domestic initiatives. This was simply not so. by the low level administrative tribunals because of limited release of such cases. While the small proportion of tribunal level cases raises the possibility that they could be unrepresentative of decisions at that level more generally, they nonetheless offer the best available data. Moreover, the fact that most of the trends we identified occurred at both tribunal and judicial level suggest that the available tribunal cases were not atypical overall.
THE REFUGEE CASES
Given the prominence of UK domestic initiatives on forced marriage the very low number of UK cases is extraordinary, even taking into account the low release rate of tribunal decisions in that jurisdiction. It is impossible to understand the reasons for this with any certainty, but it is plausible that UK legislation which presumptively treats applications from a list of countries (known as the 'white list') 55 as unfounded has had considerable impact in reducing the likelihood of forced marriage claims being adjudicated, especially at higher levels.
Applicants from 'white list' countries with negative determinations are 'certified' so that a right of appeal from original bureaucratic level decisions is operative only from outside the UK. In addition 'fast track' adjudication at first instance has been particularly problematic in gender claims, and claimants from 'safe' or white list countries are far more likely to be subject to fast track processes. 56 UK domestic initiatives concerning forced marriage have focused heavily, although not exclusively, on communities from Pakistan, Bangladesh and, to a lesser degree, India and Sri Lanka; yet none of these countries of origin appear in the ten 59 Of the total pool there were: heterosexual women 58 per cent, gay men 32 per cent, lesbians 8 per cent and heterosexual men 2 per cent. 60 The study counted 'positive' or 'negative' decisions from the perspective of the applicant, even if (as in the case of judicial review and also some UK Tribunal outcomes) the decision involves remittal and reconsideration of the claim rather than a substantive positive determination of refugee status. This gives an inflated sense of 'positive' outcomes, as we do not have access to the majority of the remittal determinations and some, perhaps many, of these will ultimately be negative to the applicant. These figures also mask significant divergence across the receiving nations: with the positive rate 43 per cent in Canada and 26 per cent in Australia. In the UK of only 11 decisions, three were positive, but two of these were in fact remittals. marriage'). Within 'threatened marriage' there was a further difference between claims which involved a specific threat of marriage to a particular individual and those which rested on a more general pressure or coercion to marry.
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There were clear differences across these categories both in terms of the representation of heterosexual women versus gay men, and in comparative rates of success. Not surprisingly, 'actual forced marriage' cases displayed a higher positive rate than 'threatened marriage'
(44 per cent compared to 28 per cent). 'Actual forced marriage' claims comprised mostly heterosexual women. 62 Among 'threatened marriage' specific threats of marriage also overwhelmingly concerned heterosexual women 63 whereas claims of a more general pressure to marry were more likely to involve gay men. 64 Marriage itself was usually the central feature of heterosexual women's claims, whereas it was often a more minor or cumulative part of claims brought by gay men. The lesbian cases were exactly divided, with half of them featuring actual forced marriage or a specific threat such that forced marriage was central to the claim in a manner akin to the heterosexual women's cases, while the other half were more similar to the gay men's claims in that homophobically motivated persecution was the core element of a claim in which marriage was a general threat or more tangential aspect. Notably, gay men were markedly more successful than heterosexual women overall (40 per cent positive compared to 27 per cent), while lesbians fell in between the two (30 per cent positive). 65 The reasons for these differences are explored below.
Claimants must demonstrate that the risk they face is 'for reasons of' one of the articulated grounds for protection: race, religion, nationality, political opinion or membership in a 61 Sixteen decisions concerned an actual forced marriage, while marriage was threatened in 104 of the decisions (comprising 63 where the threat was specific and 41 where the threat was general).
62 12 heterosexual women, 2 gay men and 2 lesbians. Six of the heterosexual women and one of the gay male claims in this category were positive, but neither of the lesbian claims succeeded.
63 48 of the 63 decisions were heterosexual women, with 10 gay men, 3 lesbians and 2 heterosexual men. One heterosexual man and one lesbian in this group were successful. 64 Of 41 decisions on general pressure, gay men compromised 26, with 10 heterosexual women, and 5 lesbians. 65 Bearing in mind that there were only 10 lesbian cases, so even one additional positive or negative decision would tilt these figures significantly. Of the two claims made by heterosexual men one was negative and the other positive. particular social group. In forced marriage cases, the nexus which is usually argued is to membership of a particular social group such as 'gay men', 'lesbians', 'homosexuals' or 'women'. Both gender and sexual orientation claims are grounded in an individual's nonconformity with prevailing social and religious codes concerning gender roles, sexual behaviour and accepted modes of family formation. UNHCR gender guidelines released in 2002 acknowledge this common underpinning, noting that sexual orientation claims 'contain a gender element' because of refusal to 'adhere to socially or culturally defined roles or expectations of behaviour attributed to his or her sex'. 66 The experience of direct persecution by state agents is rare in both gender and sexuality claims which much more commonly concern harm at the hands of non-state actors, often of an on-going rather than one-off nature, and failure of effective state protection. All groups of applicants examined in this research struggled to articulate the harm of forced marriage and to establish a nexus between their convention ground and the harm feared. However the issue of identifying the social group was particularly difficult for heterosexual women, whereas for gay men and lesbians establishing the nexus between the group and the persecution, that is, that the harm feared was 'for reasons of' their group membership, posed the major barrier. A further persistent issue for all claimants is that they must be found to be credible: their story must be believed.
Particular social group
While Canada accepted gender-based grounds for refugee claims, including forced marriage, In terms of the sluggishness of UK and Australian developments in gendered refugee jurisprudence, it is also interesting to note that even when the UK tribunal accepted in 2008 that a woman opposing FGM and forced marriage was eligible based on 'resistance to accepting the prevailing cultural norms in her own rural society', it did so largely by reference to FGM with very little engagement with the issue of marriage; moreover it expressly denied that this kind of resistance could be characterised as political opinion or imputed political opinion.
89 Australian decision-makers have also repeatedly resisted any notion that forced marriage engages any other Convention ground apart from social group.
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In contrast Canada decision-makers frequently characterised forced marriage claims as engaging both particular social group and the religious or political ground under the Convention.
Gay claimants did occasionally fail to be accepted as a social group, particularly if forced marriage was a significant part of their claim. For example in the 1998 Australian Federal
Court decision of MMM, the court collapsed gay men facing pressure to marry with 'bachelors', making the social group both trivial and nebulous:
These would, no doubt, include, for example, widowers, men keen to marry, misogynists, homosexuals, fathers and non-fathers, rich men and poor, devout Muslims and others, handsome men and ugly, those already engaged to be married and those not.
91
While gay men and lesbians were more likely to be accepted as forming a particular social group than heterosexual women because their group was seen as more finite and also as cognisable beyond the context of marriage as the harm feared, it was conversely harder for 89 FB (Sierra Leone) [2008] UKAIT 00090 'The appellant, of course, holds no political opinions. She does not approve of FGM or wish to participate in the Bondo or to marry an elderly man occupying a position of local chief. Her motives are not political in any discernible way' at [72] (emphasis in original). In considering that the prospective groom was a major local political figure the Tribunal responded that there was 'but a peripheral connection between these political strands' and 'her obvious reluctance to marry a man for whom she does not care' at [73] . 90 there is a social pressure for both males and females to marry and that the extent of that pressure varies amount [sic] different social groups. The Tribunal acknowledges that the motivation to marry is based on cultural reasons rather than any Convention related motivation.
(emphasis added)
In addition, many decision-makers simply saw no connection at all between forced marriage and homosexuality. For example in a 1998 Australian case:
The evidence is that all adult males in Bangladesh are subject to pressure to marry and form a family. A second prevalent theme in the refugee cases, which also contrasted starkly with the domestic approach to forced marriage, was the focus on physical violence to the exclusion of consideration of emotional and environmental pressure, or to diffuse but threatening behaviours such as ostracism or deprivation of sources of economic support. Instead, in the refugee decisions, lack of social or legal power and the ability to consentparticularly for women applicants -appears to be represented through the blunt proxies of education, age, urbanity and 'independence' (itself represented by the proxies of income and unaccompanied travel (and/or their sisters) was subject to close scrutiny in assessing whether they were at risk of forced marriage, whereas the education level of men claiming forced or pressured marriage was rarely mentioned and was never relevant to the determination.
Being 'highly' educated (usually taken to mean completion of secondary education), over the usual marriageable age for the country of origin, residing in an urban rather than a rural area, or exhibiting 'independence' through being employed or having travelled without parental supervision, were frequently taken to mean that female applicants did not 'fit the profile' for forced marriage. This was taken as proof that they were not 'disempowered' and were therefore able to refuse marriage (and were also capable of relocating away from any persecution or seeking state protection). 114 So, for example in a 2001 Canadian case, country evidence that urban and highly educated women in Lebanon were 'somewhat less constrained' by social customs and faced 'less severe consequences' for non-conformity than those who were less educated and lived in rural areas was re-interpreted by the decision-maker as 'objective evidence' that the claimant 'would not be subject to forced marriage, and if she were, could evade it.'
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Credibility: who families are and how they behave While in general decisions from Canada were more sophisticated than the UK and Australia in their approach to all of the issues explored above, Canada was notable for some very problematic first instance decisions on credibility (although some of these were later disapproved of on judicial review). In particular, credibility determinations in forced marriage claims revealed a range of largely unsupportable 'plausibility' assumptions 116 about what marriage is and how families behave.
Canadian tribunal members held that forced marriage claims were false on the basis that the following aspects of claims were inherently 'implausible':
• a Christian father in Kenya arranged a forced marriage for his only daughter 'with a considerably older man with multiple wives', (likewise a Christian father in Nigeria);
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• a Christian groom engaged in polygamy;
118
• family members opposed to a forced marriage did not approach state authorities in Zimbabwe;
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• a mother concerned about the forced marriage of her daughter left her 'near' the father;
120
• a 'determined and aggressive' young woman in Guinea was nevertheless forced to marry;
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• an 18 year old Chinese girl who was a 'family victim or exploitee', still telephoned her parents subsequent to a refugee claim and claimed to love them; 122 and
• an Iranian woman maintained a 'strained' relationship with her parents after refusing an arranged marriage. Many credibility or 'plausibility' findings were based squarely and solely on supposition and thus could not be falsified or verified by reference to any external indicator of likelihoodin which case applicants ought properly to be given the benefit of the doubt under basic principles of refugee law. 125 However there were also occasional decisions on credibility that could, and should, have been assessed by reference to country of origin evidence. Of these, the most troubling held on the basis of 'documentary evidence' that it was implausible that a girl would be married under the legal age of marriage in Bangladesh (18 years of age). 126 This is a shocking finding, given that numerous international human rights agencies such as UNICEF and the UN Population Fund indentify Bangladesh as a major location of child marriage, with the majority of the female population married before the age of 18, and indeed many before the age of 15.
127

WHO WINS? THE SUCCESSFUL CLAIMS
There were thirty-eight positive decisions in our data set. We counted as 'positive' decisions in which the outcome was what the refugee claimant sought at that stage. Yet judicial review decisions in all of the countries, and many tribunal level decisions in the UK, result in a redetermination of the claim, so positive decisions are not necessarily representative of substantively successful refugee outcomes. 128 In short, counting 38 of our 120 decisions as positive is highly likely to over-represent the chance of 'success' for forced marriage refugee claimants.
Searching for commonalities among these claims is not easy, especially as many of the 12 judicial review decisions do not contain much detail about the claim and thus it is difficult to ascertain a clear picture of the underlying facts, or of the basis of the original decision maker's reasoning. The successful claimants come from 22 different countries in Europe, Asia, the Middle East and Africa, and include lesbians, gay men, heterosexual women and one of the two heterosexual men in the data set. At the level of broad statistical sweep, this serves only to reinforce that each refugee determination is an individual inquiry. The positive decisions reflected typical generic elements of positive decisions in other types of refugee cases, such as strong country information in support of the claimant's story and affirmative credibility findings. As noted earlier, in gay men's claims marriage itself was usually either framed or received as tangential to the major harm and many of the positive decisions were actually made on the basis that marriage or failure to marry would lead inevitably to the exposure of the applicant's sexuality: thus the actual persecution was seen to be on the basis of homosexuality rather than by virtue of marriage.
129 128 In addition, one of the positive judicial review decisions was later overturned on appeal: see n 103 above. 129 The sole successful outcome by a (presumed by the decision maker) heterosexual man facing forced marriage was a judicial review decision in the Canadian Federal Court, which held that it was not inherently implausible that a young Malian man would face forced marriage, and thus the findings of the IRB that only women were victims was unsound: Traore v Canada (Minister of Citizenship and Immigration) [2003 ] FC 1256 (28 October 2003 .
The singularly most interesting factor in the positive cases is that forced marriage was in itself found to be a form of persecution in only 14 decisions. Even within these 14 cases the forced marriage claim was usually accompanied by 'something more', such as FGM, sexual and domestic violence, polygamy, levirate or sororat marriage. 130 Of the entire pool of 120 decisions we were able to identify only four cases in which forced marriage alone was held to be persecutory. 131 This is absolutely at odds with the characterisation of consent in marriage as a core international human right, and is stunningly out of step with the United Kingdom's domestic initiatives.
The tendency to exoticise gender claims, now well documented, 132 was notable in examining the women's positive cases. For women success coalesced around two distinct themes, one being marriage as the site of other harms likely to occur as a result within or because of the relationship, usually FGM and less often domestic violence 133 (sometimes both); the second being that the kind of marriage was sufficiently non-normative or 'foreign' to Western ideals of marriage that it was construed as distinctly harmful.
The influence of exoticising factors in the kind of marriage under consideration should not be underestimated: 11 positive decisions concerning women (both heterosexual and lesbian) involved marriages with one or more of the following factors: polygamy, a Muslim groom (when the applicant was Christian), a groom who was a generation or more older than the woman, bride price or marriage debt, levirate marriage (marriage to the woman's deceased husband's brother) or sororat marriage (marriage to a deceased sister's husband or fiancé).
These practices are culturally remote from Western decision makers, and they correlated more closely with the positive than negative decisions. In contrast, domestic violence, a harm against women seen as 'common' in both refugee sending and receiving countries,
134
was actually slightly more correlated to negative women's cases than positive ones.
In nine of the positive heterosexual women's claims, forced marriage was viewed as either a trigger for, or -less commonly -as part of a cumulative pattern of, persecution in which marriage became a site for other harms, in particular FGM. In this reasoning, forced marriage is only a harm because of its role in bringing about other more tangible forms of harm; implicitly forced marriage may have persecutory consequences rather than being in itself persecutory. One decision maker expressed this as follows:
Although there are three separate forms of harm which the applicant faces upon return to Ghana (forcible marriage, forced conversion to Islam and being denied the right to practice her religion and circumcision), I have decided to treat the harm as a whole rather than individually because in my opinion they are inextricably linked to each other and the second two harms are consequent upon the forced marriage.
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In two of the three positive decisions coming out of the United Kingdom, the claims involved an array of exoticising factors as well as subsequent or consequential harms. In TB, a young Iranian woman's politically powerful father required her to become a second wife to a 60 year old colleague of his to whom he owed a 'cultural debt'. were to return to Iran the applicant would be at risk of physical harm or death at her father's hands, and if she proceeded with the proposed marriage (under duress or by consent) she would be seriously harmed by the husband in retribution for her flight. Thus the decision addressed itself to harms which would arise after the claimant was forced to marry. In RG, the marriage in question was a levirate 'marriage by abduction' of a child. women who are forced into marriages against their will have had a basic human right violated. There are United Nations conventions to which Canada is a party which state that the right to enter freely into marriage is a basic human right. …it is not necessary for the Board [IRB] to look at whether the sanctions are so severe that they severely interfere with bodily integrity or human dignity. that the forcible marriage of the applicant without her consent constitutes serious harm … The Tribunal notes and accepts the country information set out above which indicates that while the authorities have taken some steps to protect women in Saudi Arabia from forced marriage the practice is still widespread and that the authorities are often complicit in this practice by reason of societal attitudes toward women.
In the one UK decision where forced marriage itself was seen as a harm, NS, the tribunal demonstrated a remarkable ability to focus on forced marriage as the principal harm given a factual context which included ethnic and political persecution and a serious sexual assault. 139 The Tribunal went so far as to note that the Afghan government had failed to criminalise forced marriage 140 and considered both that the applicant ought not be forced into the specific marriage with which she had been threatened and that she ought not be generally compelled to marry in order to gain the protection of a man (and thus a safer life in Kabul). The Tribunal further considered that the applicant's two young daughters would also be at risk of forced marriage. 141 It is noteworthy that one of the sitting members of the Tribunal in NS was Vice President Catriona Jarvis, who was one of the authors of the original 2000 UK Gender Guidelines (which have since been abandoned by the new tribunal).
While these 'best practice' decisions, or perhaps more accurately, best-practice-so-far decisions, do rely on human right standards, they do not go so far as to engage with ideas of individual autonomy and choice. In our view, human rights standards are an important step, but still represent a very thin vision of autonomy and self-determination. In this regard, it is instructive to contrast even the most successful forced marriage refugee claims with the work of the Forced Marriage Unit in the UK. It is to this contrast that we now turn. Farah's trip to Pakistan to visit her dying grandfather. As recounted in the case study:
THE FORCED MARRIAGE UNIT
Later that same day, Farah contacted us from a friend's house. …She pleaded with us to rescue her from the nightmare in which she had found herself.
Our rescue operation swung into action and within 48 hours our staff had got her out and brought her back to Islamabad. She had visible physical injuries where her brother and mother had attacked her and was extremely distressed.
Back in the UK the FMU arranged for her boyfriend to send her the money for a flight home. The next day they were reunited at the airport and they are now happily married.
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The same case study offers the reassurance to Britons at risk overseas that the FMU deals with cases like this every week. In December 2008, the UK press reported that the FMU's rescue activities extended to a British resident non-national as well.
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A major aim of the unit is 'community education' which is broadly targeted, including In this FMU brochure, as in other FMU texts, the harm of forced marriage is directly linked to non-conforming sexuality; a perspective rarely seen in the refugee cases. The FMU emphatically and repeatedly articulates forced marriage as a practice which disciplines nonconforming sexuality and frequently notes that it is often used against adolescents and young adults whose families have become aware that they are involved in relationships of which the families disapprove. Policy initiatives include roles for schools and teachers, health care professionals, social workers, police, community organisations and individuals in being alert to and responding to situations of forced marriage. These policy initiatives articulate a 'protective' role of the state that extends to pro-active service provision.
The ideological context of the anti-forced marriage message comes through most clearly in the 'Forced Marriage Survivor's Handbook'. 153 The handbook aims to assist those who have decided to leave a forced marriage; it sets out basic advice about finding housing or refuge, managing finances, finding a job, repaying debts and returning to education. Like other FMU documents, it highlights survivor testimonials. Most interestingly, the handbook features many blank lined pages and encourages the reader to write her or his own plans and dreams on the facing pages of the bureaucratic advice. The first is prefaced with, 'Make some notes or write a description of your new life as you'd like it to be. You'll be able to look back on this -maybe adding to it from time to time -and it will help you stay focused and 152 n 50 above, 4 (italics in the original). actualisation is the consciousness-raising precursor to the group orientation which is feminism. The marriage which is protected, valued, reified by Western law is the marriage of triumphant self-actualising individuals: precisely those who are the subjects and objects of human rights law. 155 The way forward for those who are trapped in forced marriages is to become those on whom marriage cannot be forced. The introduction to the handbook reads:
Everyone has the right to choose who they marry and when they get married. You are not wrong for having made the brave decision to leave a forced marriage. This book will give you useful and practical information to help you take control of your life and focus on the future.
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The chasm between the image of forced marriage that appears in refugee law and the image of forced marriage portrayed by the Forced Marriage Unit is deep. Indeed refugee cases often come close to portraying forced marriage as a potentially unfortunate but inevitable consequence of pervasive cultural practices. Considering the expectation that all Bangladeshi men will marry and that the 'needs of the family and the community' outweigh those of the individual, one Australian case in 1998 stated,
While not advocating … unwilling marriage …it is fair to note that the Applicant [a gay man] is a member of a whole culture and has a continued allegiance to his Muslim faith, that is, he has not discarded all aspects of his culture as oppressive to himself.
It would be enlightening to directly compare refugee claims made in the United Kingdom with the case load of the FMU. This is simply not possible because there are only a handful of available UK cases, and because those cases devote so little analysis to the question of forced marriage. As we have argued above, the positive refugee decisions are almost never about forced marriage alone. The clear analysis of forced marriage as persecution in the lone case of NS has not been picked up by later UK decision-makers, nor has the frame of reference offered by the FMU apparently had any influence. While the legal content and political context of domestic forced marriage legislation and refugee law obviously differ, we would have expected to see at least some glimmer of shared understanding of the issues emerge in the UK in recent years.
There is no equivalent to the FMU in either Canada or Australia, where, despite large migrant communities (including from South Asia) a domestic political engagement with forced marriage has not yet emerged. 158 Both Australian and Canadian governments have expressed concern about their citizens being forced into marriages while out of the country, but no domestic initiatives have materialised. 159 This increases the depth of the paradox that it is UK refugee jurisprudence which is the most out of step both with international human rights standards and the more nuanced (if sometimes paternalistic) FMU understanding of forced marriage as a means of disciplining non-normative sexualities. On the basis of our analysis of available refugee case law, we suggest that if many, perhaps most, of those individuals rescued abroad by the FMU were instead to make asylum claims of the United Kingdom, Australia or Canada on the basis of forced marriage, they would be refused. A striking illustration is the case of Humayra Abedin, a Bangladeshi national who was rescued from a forced marriage in Bangladesh through the combined efforts of the FMU and a Bangladeshi women's organisation (Ain O Salish Kendra). Although neither a British nor dual national, Humayra had been living in Britain for six years, first as a student and then as a trainee National Health Service doctor when her family tricked her into returning to Bangladesh in August 2008 in order to coerce her into a marriage she had previously rejected. The High Court of England and Wales issued a protection order on behalf of Humayra and she was ultimately brought before a court in Bangladesh which then placed her in the protection of police and British consular officers who assisted her to return to England two days later (where further protection orders were then issued to prevent her family from approaching her or attempting to remove her from the jurisdiction). 160 Yet if Humayra had made a refugee claim it is extremely unlikely that she would have succeeded.
Firstly, Humayra would have struggled within the UK jurisprudence both to articulate a particular social group and to argue that forced marriage itself constituted persecution.
While she did suffer months of forced imprisonment, 'manhandling' and involuntary medication prior to the marriage, her account of the actual marriage ceremony was that she entered into it under 'emotional duress' rather than as a response to specific threats of violence. Moreover Humayra was not young, rural, poorly educated or financially dependent upon her parents. At the time of the marriage she was 32 years old, urban, educated (indeed a doctor with a Masters level education), had travelled and lived independently and was economically self-supporting; all factors that in numerous cases we examined were held to vitiate a claim to forced marriage or the inability to access state protection. In addition, like claimants held to be 'implausible' in other cases, Humayra continued to express love for the parents who had put her through this ordeal, 'they are still my parents. I do not have any bad feelings against them, any grudges'.
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This discordance underlines that refugee law is only ever partially about human rights protection, that it recognises some types of human rights violations more keenly and more regularly than others, and that it embeds a persistent cultural relativism. In refugee law, forced marriage appears to be characterised largely as an understandable offshoot of 'culture', the defining characteristic of the 'other'. This was true in cases in all three of the countries we examined, but was most in stark in the UK. Furthermore, the contrast seen here demonstrates that while the British government has moved away from the blunt instrument of immigration restrictions as a response to forced marriage, the double standard of 'marriage for us' and 'marriage for them' continues to flourish in British asylum law. While refugee law is sometimes viewed as part of the system of human rights law, in this light it is shown to be an effective immigration law screen above all, used as a border enforcing mechanism against individuals who, if they had legal immigration status in Britain, would be entitled to state sponsored rescue and support.
The image of the strong, benevolent state rescuing victims of forced marriage through the overseas reach of the FMU is the antithesis of refugee law, where Western states defend themselves through a variety of means aimed at limiting flows of asylum seekers to their borders. Refugee law seeks to reinforce borders; the FMU acts in spite of them. This contrast is hard to square. But it seems that those in need of 'rescue' have already become enough 'us' to merit higher human rights consideration than their cultural, or even national, counterparts. It may simply be that proximity does generate affiliation, even as immigration policy-makers fret that assimilation is elusive. It may also be that many of the states where hobbled by culture and exhorted to liberal individualism, but they are nonetheless welcomed among us, urged to become more us, encouraged to replace the support of the no-longer-welfare state for that of traditional family. This tentative analysis also helps us see why refugee law struggles so with forced marriage: the 'marriage' part of the equation is not quite 'other' enough to fit the refugee framework.
